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Endogenous Matching and Contractual Choice between Agricultural Processors 





Contracts are widely used by agricultural processors for purchasing inputs not only in developed 
countries but also in developing countries such as China. The total number of formal, written 
contracts between farmers and food processors is increasing rapidly in China, and the formal 
contracts that exist are becoming more complex. Contractual design in China is evolving from 
simple price-quantity contracts toward more complicated arrangements known as cooperation 
contracts or joint-stock cooperation contracts, designed to share risk and mitigate opportunistic 
behaviors by the contracting parties. Due to small farm sizes, the contracted amount in the 
typical contract in China is very small compared with Western countries, and each processor 
usually has a large number of contracted farmers. This paper uses data from a 2003 survey of 
food processing firms by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture to analyze the determinants of 
contractual choices between these firms and farmers and the number of farmers that each firm 
contracts with. An important issue identified in the literature in analyzing the determinants of 
contractual choices is endogenous matching between parties to a contract and the effects of this 
endogenous matching on contract choice. We find strong evidence to support endogenous 
matching. In particular, our results indicate that firms which contract with a larger number of 
farms are more likely to use cooperation contracts than relational contracts. 
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Endogenous Matching and Contractual Choice between Agricultural Processors 
and Farmers in China 
 
 
According to statistics from the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, the number of 
agribusiness firms in China increased more than seventeen times between 1996 and 2008, from 
11,824 to 201,500. More than 40% of these companies are known as dragon head firms (long tou 
qi ye), a government designation based on the firms’ economic strength, operation scale, level of 
technology, management, and their potential to improve farm incomes (Guo et al. 2007). Dragon 
head firms are so named because they are considered the key to leading small farmers on the 
road to prosperity. While this may be an oversimplification, it is certainly true that improved 
marketing channels can increase farm incomes by reducing transaction costs, connecting farmers 
to a larger customer base, and opening up markets for more profitable products than the staples 
traditionally grown on Chinese farms. 
Starting with economic reforms in 1978, China has been transitioning from a planned 
economy to a market economy. Agricultural production and marketing organizations and 
systems have fundamentally changed as a result of these reforms. Under the planned economy, 
the state monopolized the purchase and marketing of agricultural products, and private business 
contracts were virtually unheard of. Production and sales of agricultural products were based on 
state plans. After economic reforms began, the government gradually overhauled regulations on 
agricultural production and marketing. Now farmers can make production and marketing 
decisions based on market information. Facing an emerging market full of uncertainties, how can 
Chinese farmers survive and be prosperous? 
The use of contracts for the production and marketing of agricultural products is 
increasing in China. Statistics from the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture indicate that the total 2 
 
number of agribusiness firms in China involved in contract farming increased more than ten-fold 
between 1996 and 2006, from 8,377 to 89,344. The vast majority (86%) of dragon head firms in 
Zhejiang province surveyed in 2004 reported that they were involved in contract farming (Guo et 
al. 2007). From the perspective of farmers, 21% of farmers in a 2004 survey of farm households 
involving 13 provinces and 47 counties in China reported that they have engaged in contract 
farming, and 76% of farmers without contracts expressed a willingness to participate in 
contracting (Guo et al. 2007). Due to small farm sizes, the contracted amount in the typical 
contract in China is very small compared with Western countries, and each processor usually has 
a large number of contracted farmers. 
Most contracts between agricultural processors and farmers in China are production 
contracts or marketing contracts, with terms including price, quantity, quality, and delivery date. 
However, contractual design in China is evolving toward more complicated arrangements 
designed to share risk and mitigate opportunistic behaviors by the contracting parties. Some 
contracts stipulate that processors will return some profits to farmers as compensation, 
particularly when the contract price is lower than the market price. These types of contracts are 
known in China as cooperation contracts. Other contracts, known as joint-stock cooperation 
contracts, require that farmers invest or deposit money with processors. Broadly speaking, this is 
a kind of vertical integration through which farmers integrate processors. Similar to cooperation 
contracts, processors return some profits to farmers as dividends. In other cases there are no 
formal, written contracts at all, a situation sometimes referred to as relational contracting. 
The objective of this paper is to use data from a survey of dragon head firms in 2003 by 
the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture to analyze the determinants of contractual choices between 
these firms and farmers and the number of farmers that each firm contracts with. The vast 3 
 
majority (86%) of the processing firms in our sample use production or marketing contracts, 
while about 8% rely on cooperation or joint-stock cooperation contracts and about 6% use 
relational contracts. Better knowledge of the mechanisms of contractual choices may assist the 
Chinese government in developing better guidelines for relationships between farmers and food 
processors, to stabilize food supplies and improve farmers’ welfare. 
 
Contracting Choice 
Formal Contracts versus Relational Contracts 
Formal contracts are written contracts with specific terms and conditions and enforceable 
by a court, whereas relational contracts are oral contracts that are implicit and rely on self-
enforcement. Formal contracts reduce the likelihood of a contract breach by the threat of legal 
action, while relational contracts offer ways to resolve the problem of opportunism by depending 
on mutual reliance. 
Hu and Qiu (2010) identified several factors that influence firms’ choices between formal 
contracts and relational contracts using a survey of 1,500 firms across ten industries from the 
World Bank’s Survey of Enterprises in China. They found that as the size of a firm increases, 
there is a greater likelihood that it will adopt formal contracts. They also found a negative effect 
of the number of clients on the likelihood of adopting formal contracts for the reason that firms 
with a large number of clients are often supplying standard goods where formal contracts may be 
unnecessary. The location of clients affects firms’ contract choices: if a firm’s clients are located 
outside its main business place, it is more likely that the firm will use formal contracts rather 
than relational contracts. Based on contracts with suppliers, similar results are derived with 
respect to firm size and the location of suppliers, but they found a positive relationship between 
number of suppliers and the adoption of formal contracts. They attribute this result to the fact 4 
 
that firms with many suppliers often rely heavily on upstream supply, and formal contracts can 
be useful in securing the supply of inputs of production. 
Do formal contracts substitute for, or complement, relational contracts? Substitution 
arguments state that when formal contracts are signed between buyers and sellers, each party’s 
motivation to cooperate with the expectation of reciprocity may be reduced (Lazzarini et al. 
2004). The use of formal contracts could also be a signal of distrust between the transacting 
parties, thus undermining the positive effects of trust to mitigate opportunism (Poppo and Zenger 
2002). On the other hand, formal contracts are typically incomplete due to the difficulty of 
foreseeing all contingencies that might arise later and the transaction costs of including all 
known contingencies in the contract. Relational contracts can help fill this void by functioning as 
an alternative enforcement mechanism when unexpected conflicts occur between the contracting 
parties (Poppo and Zenger 2002). From a dynamic perspective, trust is often established through 
relational contracting before a formal contract is established (Woolthuis et al. 2005). 
 
Characteristics of the Contracting Parties and Contract Choice 
An important issue identified by Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) in analyzing the 
determinants of contractual choices is endogenous matching between parties to a contract and the 
effects of this endogenous matching on contract choice. As they note, empirical work on 
contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed characteristics of the parties to the 
contract. If some of these characteristics are partially or wholly unobserved and there are 
incentives for particular types of parties to contract with each other, estimated coefficients on the 
observed characteristics may be biased. 
For example, farmers highly averse to risk are likely to produce low-risk crops and/or 
livestock products, and because of their risk aversion are also likely to favor contracts with 5 
 
agricultural processors that share production and price risk. Farmers less averse to risk are likely 
to make decisions about which goods to produce based primarily on expected net returns, and are 
also likely to favor contracts with processors that maximize their expected returns. Without an 
adequate measure of risk aversion on the part of farmers, an empirical analysis of the 
determinants of contract choice might mistakenly conclude that there is a cause-and-effect 
relationship between a less risky product being farmed and the likelihood of the farmer and 
processor sharing risks. Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) rely upon differences across geographic 
areas in land quality and therefore goods produced in order to help control for endogenous 
matching. 
It is also possible that contractual design and contractual participation are simultaneously 
determined. A contract may be designed to encourage participation or participation in a contract 
may alter the contractual design. Without taking into account the endogeneity resulting from this 
simultaneity problem, empirical studies will be biased. 
Studies of the U.S. hog industry, which has seen significant growth in contracting 
between farmers and processors during the past decade, have found that producers more averse 
to price risk are more likely to use contracts (Franken et al. 2009), and that producers who use 
production contracts are more risk averse than those who use spot markets or marketing contracts 
(Zheng et al. 2008). Studies have also found that hog producers’ investments in assets specific to 
the relationship with their primary buyer are positively related to their use of contracts (Franken 
et al. 2009). 
 
Contract Performance and Contract Choice 
China has a large number of very small farms. As a result, the monetary value of a 
contract between a farmer and a processor is often very small, which might lead to opportunistic 6 
 
behaviors by both parties to a contract. If a farmer breaches a contract, the processor could only 
get a little from suing the farmer but the processor could incur significant legal costs. If a 
processor breaches a contract, the farmer usually cannot pay the high legal costs of suing the 
processor. This is inefficient because it increases transaction costs and hurts long-term 
relationships between farmers and processors. For this reason, a processor contracting with a 
large number of small farms may adopt contracts that could reduce the likelihood of such 
opportunistic behaviors. 
Guo and Jolly (2008) used data from a 2004 survey of dragon head firms in Zhejiang 
province in China to explore the effects of contractual arrangements on contract performance. 
They found that 72% of the responding firms engaged in contract farming reported that more 
than 75% of their contracting farmers fulfilled their contracts. Reasons cited for nonperforming 
contracts included failure on the part of farmers to deliver goods that meet quality requirements, 
and selling contracted goods to other parties due to higher prices offered. Over one-half (53%) of 
the responding firms indicated that they had no way to resolve contractual conflicts, and only 7% 
pursued legal action. 
Guo and Jolly (2008) found that oral contracts have a significantly higher probability of 
fulfillment than written contracts. This could be due to the fact that most oral contracts are found 
in cases where firms do not contract directly with farmers but instead go through intermediaries 
such as cooperatives or traders. These intermediaries usually form networks with well-
established rules and norms, and farmers who fail to comply damage their reputation and risk 
losing future business. Guo and Jolly (2008) also found that contract features, such as bonus 
clauses for successful fulfillment and floor pricing (where firms pay farmers the higher of the 7 
 




A special interpersonal network called guanxi plays an important role in governing how 
individuals, businesses, and government officials behave in the Chinese context. Being a unique 
part of Eastern culture, guanxi does not have an equivalent word in English. Lovett et al. (1999) 
regard guanxi as networks of informal relationships and exchanges of favors. Fan (2002) tried to 
clarify guanxi by pointing out that personal relationships do not automatically lead to the 
development of guanxi and that guanxi is an action taken deliberately for a specific purpose. Fan 
(2002) defines guanxi as “a process of social interactions that initially involve two individuals (A 
and B) who may or may not have special relationships. Later A may ask B for assistance in 
finding a solution to a problem, while B does not have the solution at hand and has to seek 
further assistance from other connections, thus starting another process.” Lu (2006) defined three 
categories of guanxi separately, though they are often intertwined to form a multilayered 
network: family guanxi is referred to the relationship between family members and is ruled by 
the need for social exchange and resource distribution; friend guanxi is defined as the 
relationship between longtime friends in order to obtain material benefits based on the 
reciprocity rule; business guanxi involves in finding business (rather than personal) solutions 
through personal connections and is governed by the equity rule.  
Using data from a survey of 167 vegetable farmers, Lu et al. (2010) found that farmers’ 
guanxi networks were positively related to relationship-building with buyers and transaction-
specific investments. They also found that guanxi networks improved farmers’ participation in 8 
 
modern high-value markets (e.g. supermarkets and international markets) and promoted 
relational transactions. 
 
Empirical Model and Data 
Our dataset, described below, contains information about the types of contracts between 
dragon head firms and farmers, and the number of contracted farmers for each firm. The types of 
contracts in the dataset are divided into price-quantity contracts (specifying terms such as price, 
quantity, quality, and delivery date), cooperation contracts (arrangements where processors 
return some profits to farmers in order to share risk and mitigate opportunistic behaviors), joint-
stock cooperation contracts (where farmers share profits and also invest or deposit money with 
processors), and relational contracts/other types of informal arrangements. Because of the small 
number of joint-stock cooperation contracts in the dataset, they are combined with cooperation 
contracts for modeling and estimation purposes. 
Let  0 1 i y   if firm i chooses a relational/other type of contractual arrangement with its 
farmers and 0 otherwise; let  1 1 i y   if firm i chooses a price-quantity contract and 0 otherwise; 
and let  2 1 i y   if firm i chooses a cooperation contract and 0 otherwise. These three options are 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive, so that we have a trinomial choice specification. Let  i n  
denote the log of the number of contracted farmers for firm i (a logarithmic transformation gives 
better results than a linear specification). Allowing for the possibility that the number of 
contracted farmers is endogenous to contract choice and vice versa, the empirical model is a 
simultaneous equation trinomial probit model: 
(1) 
*
ij j i j i ij yn x e    ( 1, 2 j  ), 
(2) 
*




11 22 ii i i i ny yz e    . 
The 
*
ij y  are latent variables measuring the utility or payoff to each contract option, with  1 1 i y   
when 
**
10 0 ii yy   and 
**
12 ii y y  ;  2 1 i y   when 
**
20 0 ii yy   and 
**
21 ii y y  ; and  0 1 i y   when 
*
1 0 i y   and 
*
2 0 i y  . The utility of each option is measured relative to a relational/other contract, 
which is why 
*
0 0 i y  .  i x  and  i z  are vectors of exogenous variables that may partially overlap. 
The parameters to be estimated are  j  ,  j  ,  1  ,  2  , and  . The error terms  1 i e ,  2 i e  and  i e  are 
assumed to follow a trivariate normal distribution. 
Estimation of equations (1)-(3) via full-information maximum likelihood would be 
difficult. Amemiya (1978) develops a two-stage estimation procedure for a simultaneous 
equation model with a binomial choice variable and a continuous variable, but it has limited 
efficiency. Rivers and Vuong (1988) develop a limited information maximum likelihood 
procedure for a similar model that can be extended to the trinomial choice case that we have, and 
is more efficient than Amemiya’s (1978) procedure.  Rivers and Vuong (1988) also propose a 
test for exogeneity that is important for testing our hypothesis of endogenous matching. For 
comparison purposes, we also estimate non-simultaneous models, with equations (1)-(2) 
estimated separately from equation (3). In these estimations, 
*
1 i y  and 
*
2 i y  in equation (3) are 
replaced by their discrete counterparts  1 i y  and  2 i y . For the non-simultaneous models we estimate 
equations (1)-(2) by both multinomial probit and multinomial logit in order to compare the 
results.
1 
                                                 
1 In the multinomial logit model, the assumption of jointly distributed, normal error terms in equation (1) is replaced 
by an assumption of independent error terms, each following a Gumbel distribution. 10 
 
The data used in this study come from business reports for 582 state key processors in 
2003.
2 Excluding cases of missing data for some or all of the variables used in our analyses 
reduces the sample size to 491. The variables used here are listed and defined in Table 1, while 
summary statistics are presented in Table 2. The vast majority (86%) of firms use production or 
marketing contracts, while about 8% rely on cooperation or joint-stock cooperation contracts and 
about 6% use relational contracts. The average number of contracted farmers is very large, with a 
mean of about 87,000 farms for the entire sample. The average varies across contract types, with 
it being about 30% smaller for cooperation contracts than for price-quantity or relational 
contracts. 
The variables in  i x  in equation (1) include the East and Middle regional dummies (the 
control region is West), dummy variables for the main ingredient in the processor’s products, a 
dummy for whether the firm is publicly listed, a dummy for whether it has a license to 
import/export, a dummy for whether the processor’s products are certified by the Chinese 
government as “Green Food”, the firm’s debt-asset ratio, and the firm’s credit score. The 
variables in  i z  in equation (3) include the East and Middle regional dummies, dummy variables 
for the main ingredient in the processor’s products, the log of the firm’s fixed assets, the firm’s 
debt-asset ratio, and the log of the firm’s profit from last year (2002). 
As mentioned earlier, a processor contracting with a large number of small farms may be 
more likely to adopt contracts that reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behaviors. If so, then on 
                                                 
2 The criteria by which a processor is certified as a state key agricultural processor are listed in Provisional Rules on 
Certificating and Supervising the State Key Agricultural Processors, which was issued by the Chinese Ministry of 
Agriculture in 2001. This law has nine articles laying out the requirements for a processor to be a state key 
processor, such as firm scale, annual sales, operational details, the number of related farmers, credit scores and so 
on. For instance, the capital stock and annual sales should not be less than 100 million and 150 million Yuan, 
respectively; the number of related farmers should not be less than 3,000 in eastern provinces; and the processor’s 
credit score should not be less than A. The term “state” in “state key processor” refers to the fact that the designation 
comes from the government, not that the processor is necessarily state-owned. 11 
 
the basis of the literature review above one would expect  1 0    in equation (1), because 
relational contracts offer more scope for mitigating opportunistic behaviors than price-quantity 
contracts. One would also expect  12     because cooperation contracts are also superior to 
price-quantity contracts in this regard. 
 In equation (3), the difference between   1   and  2   is ambiguous.  One the one hand, 
cooperation contracts involve greater transaction costs per farm on the part of the processing firm 
than simpler price-quantity contracts. On the other hand, cooperation contracts are more stable as 
they can reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behaviors, so that they may attract more risk-
averse farmers. The sign of  1   is also uncertain because relational contracts might entail greater 
or fewer transaction costs than price-quantity contracts. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Estimation results for the contracting choice equations are shown in Table 3, while results 
for the log of the number of contracted farmers equation are shown in Table 4. River-Vuong 
(1988) tests for exogeneity indicate that cooperation contracts are endogenously determined 
while the price-quantity contracts are not. These results make sense, as cooperation contracts are 
more intensive in their relationship between the contracting parties. Hence, the following 
discussion is based primarily on the multinomial probit model for price-quantity contracts and 
the simultaneous equation model for cooperation contracts. For the number of contracted 
farmers, a Hausman test cannot reject the null-hypothesis of exogeneity, so that the OLS results 
are preferred. 
Table 3 indicates that the log of the number of contracted farmers is not statistically 
significant for price-quantity contract choice, but it is positive and statistically significant for 12 
 
cooperation contracts. Relative to relational contracts, these results indicate that cooperation 
contracts involve a larger number of farmers. This may be due to the superiority of cooperation 
contracts (and all formal contracts) over relational contracts in mitigating opportunistic 
behaviors. Some cooperation contracts also require that farmers invest or deposit money with 
processors, and from a processor’s perspective a larger number of investors is preferable to a 
smaller number. 
The point estimate of the difference between the estimated coefficients on the log of the 
number of farmers between price-quantity contracts and cooperation contracts in the 
simultaneous equation model is negative ( 12 ˆˆ 0.39     ). The estimation procedure used for 
this model does not provide a value for the covariance between the estimated parameters  1 ˆ   and 
2 ˆ  . If we take the estimated correlation coefficient of 0.71 between  1 ˆ   and  2 ˆ   from the 
multinomial probit model and apply that to the simultaneous equation model, we obtain a z-
statistic of  1.08  , so we cannot reject the null hypothesis that  12    . 
The estimated coefficient on the license to import/export variable is positive and 
statistically significant in all three price-quantity contract models in Table 3. This implies that 
processing firms with a license to import and export are more likely to use price-quantity 
contracts than relational/other contracts. Compared to relational contracts, formal contracts offer 
greater specificity with respect to terms such as quantity, quality, and delivery date that are very 
important in doing business internationally. Our results are consistent with Hu and Qiu (2010), 
who found that if a firm’s clients are located outside its main business place, it is more likely that 
the firm will use formal contracts rather than relational contracts. 
The estimated coefficient on the Green Food variable is also positive and statistically 
significant for the multinomial probit and multinomial logit price-quantity contract models in 13 
 
Table 3. Green Food certification requires a commitment on the part of the processor to meet 
specified food safety and quality standards. Compared to relational contracts, formal contracts 
provide a mechanism for processors to specify required standards to their farm suppliers in 
written detail. The coefficients for the meat dummy are positive and statistically significant 
except for the instrument-variable estimation of cooperation contract. It nonetheless indicates the 
meat processors are more like to take formal contracts with farmers, as the life circle of animals 
are very long and very difficult to stock, and therefore more likely to encounter market risks 
resulting from price changes, and hence meat processors are more likely to have some formal 
contracts to fix prices. 
The East region dummy variable in Table 3 is negative and statistically significant for all 
three sets of price-quantity contract results as well as the simultaneous equation results for 
cooperation contracts. This suggests that processors in the East are more likely to use relational 
contracts, and less likely to use price-quantity or cooperation contracts, than processors in other 
regions of China, all other things held constant. The Meat dummy variable is positive and 
statistically significant for price-quantity contracts in the simultaneous equation model, implying 
that meat processors are more likely to use price-quantity contracts than relational contracts. 
In Table 4, the contract type variables are not statistically significant for either the OLS 
or simultaneous equation models. The difference between the estimated coefficients on the 
cooperation and price-quantity contract variables in OLS model is not statistically significant. 
While the mean value for the number of contracted farmers in Table 2 is lower for cooperation 
contracts (60,623) than price-quantity contracts (89,243), it appears that this difference can be 
explained by other variables than the form of the contact itself. 14 
 
The estimated coefficients on the Dairy dummy variable in Table 4 is negative and 
statistically significant for both the OLS and simultaneous equation models, while those for the 
Grain and Vegetables & Fruit dummy variables are statistically significant in the OLS model. 
The estimated coefficient from the OLS model implies that dairy processors, ceteris paribus, 
contract with fewer farmers, but grain and vegetables & fruit processors contract with more 
farmers than other types of food processors. Milk is a perishable product and hence dairy 
processors are typically located close to dairy farms. On the other hand, transportation of grains 
and vegetables & fruit is generally less constrained by perishability considerations, except for 
certain fresh fruits and vegetables. The estimated coefficient on the log of fixed assets variable in 
Table 4 is positive and statistically significant for both the OLS and simultaneous equation 
models. Fixed assets have two effects: (1) more fixed assets imply that the scale of a processor is 
larger and the processor needs to contract with more farmers for inputs; and (2) fixed assets can 
be viewed as collateral for contracts and can attract more farmers. 
The estimated coefficient on the debt-asset ratio is positive and statistically significant for 
the OLS model, and not statistically significant in the simultaneous equation model. A high debt-
asset ratio may indicate that there is a risk of the processor running into financial difficulties and 
not being able to pay its suppliers. In response to this situation, each contracting farm may limit 
the amount of business it does with such a processor in order to mitigate nonpayment risk. 
Holding constant the scale of the processor’s operation (done here via the fixed assets variable), 
it follows that a processor with a high debt-asset ratio must contract with a larger number of 
farmers. The estimated OLS coefficient implies that a one percentage point increase in the debt-
asset ratio is associated with an increase of about 0.8% in the number of contracted farmers. 15 
 
The Middle region dummy variable is positive and statistically significant for both the 
OLS and simultaneous equation models. The reason for these results is unclear. Compared to the 
West, which is the control region, the average value of agricultural production per farm is higher 
in the Middle region. Holding constant the scale of a processor’s operation, this would suggest a 
smaller number of farms in the Middle and an even small number in the East relative to the 
West. 
Overall, we find strong evidence of endogenous matching between farmers and 
processors, particularly for cooperation contracts. We find that firms which contract with a larger 
number of farms are more likely to use cooperation contracts than relational contracts. We also 
find that processing firms with more fixed assets contract with a greater number of farmers, 
which may be due in part to the fact that fixed assets can be viewed as collateral for contracts 
that attracts more farmers. We find that dairy processors contract with a smaller number of 
farms, while grain and vegetables & fruit processors contract with more farmers, which can be 
attributable to perishability and transportation considerations for these products. 
 
Conclusions 
Contracts are widely used by agricultural processors for purchasing inputs not only in 
developed countries but also in developing countries such as China. The total number of formal, 
written contracts between farmers and food processors is increasing rapidly in China, and the 
formal contracts that exist are becoming more complex. Contractual design in China is evolving 
from simple price-quantity contracts toward more complicated arrangements designed to share 
risk and mitigate opportunistic behaviors by the contracting parties. Due to small farm sizes, the 
contracted amount in the typical contract in China is very small compared with Western 
countries, and each processor usually has a large number of contracted farmers. 16 
 
The objective of this paper was to use data from a 2003 survey of food processors by the 
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture to analyze the determinants of contractual choices between these 
firms and farmers and the number of farmers that each firm contracts with. We find strong 
evidence to support endogenous matching between farmers and processors. In particular, our 
results indicate that firms which contract with a larger number of farms are more likely to use 
cooperation contracts than relational contracts. We also find that processing firms with a license 
to import and export are more likely to use price-quantity contracts than relational/other 
contracts. Compared to relational contracts, formal contracts offer greater specificity with respect 
to terms such as quantity, quality, and delivery date that are very important in doing business 
internationally. We also find that firms with Green Food certification are more likely to use 
price-quantity contracts than relational contracts. Compared to relational contracts, formal 
contracts provide a mechanism for processors to specify required Green Food safety and quality 
standards to their farm suppliers in written detail. 
In terms of the number of contracted farmers, we find that processing firms with more 
fixed assets contract with a greater number of farmers, which may be due in part to the fact that 
fixed assets can be viewed as collateral for contracts that attracts more farmers. We also find that 
dairy processors contract with a smaller number of farms, while grain and vegetables & fruit 
processors contract with more farmers, which can be attributable to perishability and 
transportation considerations for these products. 
  17 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Relationships  This variable indicates how the processor is linked with farmers. 
0=relational contracting/other; 1=price-quantity contract; 2=cooperatives and joint stock cooperatives 
Cooperative Relationship: Processors and farmers are related through the formation of cooperatives, professional 
associations or other cooperative organizations. Group participation of farmers is intended to improve farmers’ 
bargaining position, enhance market power and realize their interests. 
Joint-stock Cooperative Relationship: In this case, processors and farmers are more tightly related. Farmers not 
only participate in work but also become shareholders. 
Relational contracting/other: Informal relationships such as oral agreements 
Contract  1=the processor and farmers are linked through contracts; 0=not 
Cooperative  1=the processor and farmers are linked through intermediaries of cooperatives and joint stock cooperatives; 0=not 
Region  East  1=the processor is located in the east region of China; 0=not 
East areas include Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Hainan. 
Middle  1=the processor is located in the middle region of China; 0=not 
Middle areas include Shanxi, Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan. 
West  1=the processor is located in the west region of China; 0=not 
West areas include Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang. 
Main 
Ingredient 
Grain  1=the main ingredient of the processor’s main product is grain; 0=not 
Vegetables& Fruit  1=the main ingredients of the processor’s main product are vegetables and fruit; 0=not 
Meat  1=the main ingredient of the processor’s main product is meat; 0=not 
Dairy  1=the main ingredient of the processor’s main product is dairy; 0=not 
  Other  1=the main ingredient of the processor’s main product is some other product; 0=not 
Publicly Listed  1=the processor is publicly listed; 0=not 
License to Import/Export  1= the processor has a license to import and export; 0=not 
Green Food  1=the main product is green food; 0=not 
The main product is authenticated as “Green Food” by CGFDC (China Green Food Development Center).  
http://www.greenfood.org.cn/sites/GREENFOOD/  
ln(Number of Farmers)  The natural logarithm of the number of farmers 
ln(Fixed Assets)   The natural logarithm of fixed assets 
Debt-Asset Ratio  Debt divided by asset (Unit: %) 
Credit Score  1=A; 2=AA; 3=AAA 
Credit score is evaluated by CFNA (China Chamber of Commerce For Import and Export of Foodstuffs, Native 
Produce and Animal Byproducts). Basing on quality indicators, competitiveness index, indicators of financial 
status, credit history indicators, and project performance indicators, CFNA rates firms on a scale of AAA to C 
including five classes: AAA, AA, A, B and C. In our dataset, no firm is rated as B or C. 
http://www.cccfna.org.cn/default.aspx 20 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Type of Relationship 
with Farmers 
Total Price-Quantity  Contract  Cooperation  Contracts  Relational 
Contracts/Other 
  Number  Percentage Number  Percentage Number  Percentage Number  Percentage 
Number of Observations  491  100  422  85.95  40  8.15    29  5.91 
Region  East  241  49.08 194  45.97 25  62.50 22  75.86 
Middle 141  28.72 133  31.52 6  15.00 2  6.90 
West  109  22.20 95  22.51 9  22.50 5  17.24 
Main 
Ingredient 
Grain  92  18.74 83  19.67 6  15.00 3  10.34 
Vegetables 
& Fruit 
83  16.90  75 17.77  3 7.50  5 17.24 
Meat  62  12.63 56  13.27 4  10.00 2  6.90 
Dairy 35  7.13 27  6.40 3  7.50 5  17.24 
Publicly  Listed  49  9.98  40 9.48  6 15.00  3 10.34 
License  to  Import/Export  408  83.10 356  84.36 33  82.50 19  65.52 
Green Food  303  61.71  270  63.98    21  52.50  12  41.38 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Number of Farmers  86836  261057  89243  275614   60623  88722  87965  196063 
Fixed Assets 
(10000RMB) 
27039 77828 26533 82115 35561  50568 22654  30465 
Debt-Asset Ratio (%)  47.1  14.7  46.8  14.6  48.1  12.1  49.8  19.2 
Credit  Score  2.36 0.68 2.35 0.69 2.43  0.75 2.38  0.49 
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Table 3. Estimation Results, Contract Choice 
 
Dependent Variable  Price-Quantity Contract  Cooperation Contract 
Model Type  Multinomial Probit  Multinomial Logit  Simultaneous Equation 















ln(Number of Farmers)  -.036  -0.37  -0.06  -0.45  0.24  1.09  -0.03  -0.30  -0.06  -0.37  0.66  3.96** 
Region East  -0.77  -2.13**  -1.09  -2.00**  -0.56 -2.25**  -0.48  -1.16  -0.76 -1.15  -0.85  -2.07** 
Middle  0.54  1.04 0.90  1.03  0.54 1.17  0.01  0.02  0.16 0.15  -0.17  -0.26 
Main 
Ingredient 
Grain  0.58  1.30 0.74  1.09  0.17 0.59  0.23  0.47  0.23 0.29  -0.43  -1.07 
Vegetables
& Fruit 
0.30  0.78  0.23 0.41 0.26  0.71  -0.53  -1.07  -1.04  -1.28  -0.81  -1.18 
Meat  0.67  1.34 0.86  1.09  0.95 2.19**  0.19  0.34  0.24 0.25  0.57  0.88 
Dairy  -0.58  -1.20  -0.70 -0.98 0.05  0.11 -0.61  -1.04  -0.79  -0.84  -0.11  -0.21 
Publicly  Listed  -0.26  -0.55  -0.42 -0.62 -0.09  -0.26  0.29 0.56 0.32  0.41 -0.24  -0.51 
License to Import/Export  0.64  1.82*  0.96  1.86*  0.61  2.45**  0.49  1.16  0.83  1.22  0.49  1.20 
Green  Food  0.59  2.12**  0.82  1.98**  0.32 1.55  0.25  0.76  0.38 0.75  0.39  1.33 
Debt  Ratio  -0.01  -1.00 -0.01  -1.04  -0.01 -1.40  -0.003  -0.26  -0.01 -0.35  0.00  0.66 
Credit  Score  -0.06  -0.29  -0.06 -0.20 -0.05  -0.35  0.04 0.17 0.08  0.22 -0.29  -1.20 
Constant 2.46  2.14**  3.45  1.96**  -1.01  -0.46  0.48  0.36  0.93  0.43  -6.05  -3.64** 
Rivers-Vuong Test for 
Exogeneity 
       χ
2
(1) = 1.23          χ
2
(1) = 3.37* 
 
 
Note: * *and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Estimation Results, Number of Farmers 
 










Price-Quantity Contract  -0.17 -0.61  -1.29  -0.43 
Cooperation Contract  -0.11  -0.33  -0.49  -0.06 
Region East 0.01  0.06 -0.14 -0.61 
Middle 0.52  2.95*** 0.51  2.48** 
Main 
Ingredient 
Grain 0.32  1.92* 0.29  1.06 
Vegetables& 
Fruit 0.57  2.56***  0.54  1.51 
Meat -0.11  -0.61 -0.01 -0.04 
Dairy -0.97  -3.95***  -1.08 -2.51** 
ln(Fixed Assets)  0.41  6.07*** 0.40  4.68*** 
Debt-Asset Ratio  0.00  1.18  0.00  0.89 
ln(Last Year’s Profit)  0.05  0.74  0.05  0.44 
Constant 5.69  8.80***  6.81  2.92*** 
Hausman Test for 
Exogeneity  χ
2
(10) = 8.15 
 
Note: ***, **and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively. 
 